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CONFLICT OF LAWS-Illinois Supreme Court Rejects the
Doctrine of Lex Loci Delicti.
Wayne Ingersoll was a guest in an automobile when the vehicle broke
through thin ice on the Iowa side of the Mississippi River. Ingersoll,
who drowned, and the driver of the automobile were Illinois residents.
Marie Ingersoll, Administrator of the Estate of Wayne Ingersoll, filed
an action for wrongful death against Walter and William Klein in the
Circuit Court of Carroll County, State of Illinois. The first two counts of
the complaint, based on the Iowa Code,' alleged that the driver of the
automobile, Walter Klein, drove recklessly while under the influence of
alcohol. The second two counts of the complaint, again in accordance
with the Iowa Code,2 alleged that William Klein, as owner of the ve-
hicle, was liable for damages.
Defendants requested an admission of facts and plaintiff admitted
the following: (1) that the plaintiff and all those who would benefit
from the law suit resided in Illinois; (2) that the deceased, Wayne In-
gersoll, met his death by drowning in the Mississippi River; and (3)
that the decased, Wayne Ingersoll, at the time of his death and immedi-
ately prior thereto was a resident of Illinois.3
Defendants moved to strike and dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action, claiming that Illinois law was applicable while
Iowa law was pleaded. The motion to dismiss was granted. The
plaintiff elected to stand on her complaint as amended. 4
Plaintiff appealed, contending, inter alia, that there was error in de-
termining which state's law was applicable.
.The Appellate Court for the Second District affirmed the Circuit
Court decision.5 The Illinois Supreme Court, after granting leave to
appeal, also affirmed, concluding that due to the arbitrary nature of the
I. Chap. 321, 494, IOwA CODE. "The owner or operator of a motor vehicle shall
not be liable for any damages to any passenger or person riding in said motor vehicle
as a guest or by invitation and not for hire unless damage is caused as a result of the
driver of said motor vehicle being under the influence of intoxicating liquor or because
of the reckless operation by him of said motor vehicle."
2. Chap. 321, 493, Iowa Code, "In all cases where damage is done by any car
by reason of the negligence of the driver, and driver with the consent of the owner, the
owner of the car shall be liable for such damage."
3. 106 Ill. App. 2d 330 (1969).
4. Id. at p. 335. Plaintiff substituted the personal representative of the defendant
William Klein as a defendant in the suit.
5. Id. at p. 330.
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doctrine of lex loci delicti a 'most significant contacts' rule best served
the interests of the state and the parties involved in a multi-state tort ac-
tion. Therefore, the trial court rightly dismissed the complaint for not
stating a cause of action, since Illinois law was applicable.6
The significance of the decision in Ingersoll v. Klein lies in the clear
rejecton of lex loci delicti7 as a basis for solving multi-state tort actions
in Illinois. The plaintiff, out of necessity, based his complaint on Iowa
law.' Consequently, he had to argue that the right to recover was de-
termined by the law of the place where the tort was committed. Lex
loci delicti had been well established in Illinois,9 and although there
had been some confusion recently,'0 no court, until Ingersoll, had de-
clined to apply this rule to a guest-host tort liability situation."
Lex loci delicti had been reaffirmed as the Illinois rule for multi-state
tort actions in the leading case of Marchlik v. Coronet Insurance Co. 2
In Marchlik, an automobile accident occurred in Wisconsin between a
Wisconsin resident and a Michigan resident driving a car registered in
Wisconsin. The guest of the Michigan driver, the plaintiff, sued the
insurance company under the authority of Wisconsin's "direct action"
statute. The insurance policy had been issued in Illinois and the suit
was filed in Illinois. The Illinois Supreme Court, after stating its general
adherence to the rule of lex loci delicti, refused enforcement of Wiscon-
sin's substantive law because it was contrary to Illinois public policy.
The court stated, "[T]he lex loci delictus or law of the place of the
wrong generally governs where the substantive rights of the parties will
be affected."' 3
Wartell v. Formusa,'4 a 1966 decision, had been the only clear quali-
fication of lex loci delicti by the Illinois Supreme Court. This case in-
volved two Illinois residents, a husband and wife, who suffered an auto-
mobile accident in Florida. The wife sued the husband in Illinois for
6. - Ill. 2nd -, 262 N.E.2d 593, 597 (1970).
7. "Lex Loci Delictus. The law of the place where the crime or wrong took
place. More fully expressed by the words lex loci delicti commisse (law of the place
where a tort is committed), usually written more briefly as lex loci delicti, or some-
times, simply lex delicti." Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, p. 1056.
8. A guest is not allowed to sue his host in Illinois, unless there is willful and
wanton misconduct by the Host. ILL. REV. STAT. 1967, Ch. 95 , Sec. 9-201.
9. See e.g. Marchlick v. Coronet Insurance Co., 40 111. 2d 327 (1968).
10. Graham v. General U.S. Grant Post No. 2663, 97 Ill. App. 2d 139, 239 N.E.2d
856 (1968) af'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 43 Ill. 2d 1, 248 N.E.2d
657 (1969).
11. See note 9, supra.
12. 40 Iil. 327.
13. Id. at p. 330.
14. 34 11. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966).
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injuries she had sustained. The court declined to apply Florida law
to the issue of whether or not a wife could sue a husband. Instead, the
court applied Illinois law, holding:
The law of the place of the wrong should of course determine
whether or not a tort has in fact been committed, but the distinct
question of whether one spouse can maintain an action in tort
against the other spouse is clearly a matter which should be gov-
erned by the law of the domicile of the persons involved.1 5
The qualification of the place of the injury rule in Wartell had been
limited to interspousal immunity suits until 1968, when the Appellate
Court decided Graham v. General U.S. Grant Post No. 2665.16 The
case involved a suit in Illinois by an Illinois resident for an injury sus-
tained in Wisconsin when an allegedly intoxicated Illinois resident col-
lided with the plaintiff's automobile. The plaintiff sued the Illinois
liquor store which had sold the alcoholic beverages to the defendant.
The issues presented were whether Illinois law was applicable to the
case and whether the Illinois Dram Shop Act applied extraterritorily.
In determining whether Illinois law was applicable, the court conducted
a thorough review of modern approaches to conflicts problems17 and
concluded that it was most desirable to "[A]dopt [the] . . . concept of
of the effect of abandoning the mechanical rule of thumb application of
the lex loci delicti rule." 18
The court began its analysis by stating the rationale underlying the
rule of lex loci delicti, which was "Its mechanical simplicity, with the
assumed predictability of results as a corollary . . ."19 Then the court,
citing from leading cases,2" explained that lex loci delicti fails to take
account of policy considerations in evaluating the significance of cir-
cumstances having a foreign situs, and ignores the interest which juris-
dictions other than that where the tort occurred may have in the resolu-
tion of particular issues. As a conseqence of the often harsh, unjust
results that the lex loci delicti rule provides, the court turned to § 379
of the Restatement (Second) Conflict Of Laws (1969)21 and Cheatham
& Reese's summary of policy factors affecting choice of law rules. 22
Cheatham & Reese's policy factors are:
15. 34 Ill. 2d 57, 59.
16. 97 Ill. App. 2d 139.
17. Id. at p. 148.
18. Id. at p. 155.
19. Id. at p. 149.
20. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963);
Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
21. Infra p. 233.
22. 52 COL. L. REV. 959 (1952).
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(1) The needs of the interstate and international systems; (2) A
court should apply its own local law unless there is a good reason
for not doing so; (3) A court should seek to effectuate the purpose
of its relevant local law rule in determining a question of choice of
law; (4) Certainty, predictability, uniformity of result; (5) Pro-
tection of justified expectations; (6) Application of the law of the
state of dominant interest; (7) Ease in determination of applicable
law; convenience of the court; (8) The fundamental policy under-
lying the broad local law field involved; (9) Justice in the indi-
vidual case." 23
The court concluded that each decision involving a conflicts problem
must "forthrightly assert the basic factors underlying its rationale."24
Unlike the lex loci delicti which is a mechanical application of simple
principles, the court asserted that the factors involved in that case were
the welfare and protection of Illinois citizens, the regulation of the
evils attendant to the liquor traffic, and the redress of injury or loss of
support arising therefrom.25 Since these factors were concerned with
Illinois citizens and Illinois liquor traffic, the court reasoned it had to
give extraterritorial effect to Illinois' Dram Shop Act and apply it to the
facts of that case. The court felt "[T]he location of any injury caused
by the intoxication, either within or without the state . . . [was] . . . ir-
relevant."26
Upon further appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the Ap-
pellate Court's decision in Graham.27 In passing on the question of ex-
traterritoriality, the court refused to extend the effect of the Illinois
Dram Shop Act to an accident which had occurred in Wisconsin. The
reversal was based on this issue. The court did not stop at this point,
however, it went on to cite Wartell and stated:
A number of Courts, including this Court, have approved and
adopted the "center of gravity" rule in common-law tort actions
brought by one member of a family against another where the in-
jury occurred in a state other than the family's domicile. 28
It appears that since the court reasoned that the act was not to be
given extraterritorial effect, the present status of the lex loci delicti
rule in Illinois was not directly relevant. This left the status of the lex
loci delicti rule unclear. Had the court meant to affirm strict lex loci
delicti, it should have logically dismissed the suit because Illinois law
23. Id.
24. 97 Il. App. 2d at 153.
25. Id. at p. 159.
26. Id. at p. 148.
27. 43 Ill. 2d 1.
28. Id. at p. S.
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would not apply to an accident in Wisconsin. Yet the court reached the
question of the extraterritoriality of the statute, and this implied that the
Illinois law might be applicable if the Legislature had intended it to have
extraterritorial effect.
The Illinois Supreme Court resolved this uncertainty by rejecting lex
loci delicti in dispensing with Marie Ingersoll's appeal.
This rejection of the classical doctrine has fostered a new approach to
multi-state tort actions in Illinois. In the past, the Illinois Supreme
Court had accepted the position that foreign law created the right of ac-
tion which followed the injured party to the forum of his selection. The
party was said to have a vested right in the cause of action.2 9 The forum
state had an obligation to protect that right unless public policy for-
bad protection. Consequently, under the theory of lex loci delicti, the
state where the accident took place had the only legitimate interest in oc-
currences within its borders.
Today, the more modem approach is to also consider the interests of
jurisdictions other than the state where the accident occurred.30 This
is evidenced by the often cited case of Babcock v. Jackson3 which in-
volved two New York citizens in a one car accident in Ontario. The
New York Court of Appeals allowed the guest to sue the host in spite
of Ontario's prohibition against such suits, saying:
Justice, fairness and "the best practical result" [citation omitted]
may best be achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the
jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the
occurrence of the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific
issue raised in the litigation.3 2
This approach recognizes the position that a state can have a legiti-
mate interest in occurrences outside of its jurisdiction. Thus, the re-
jection of the traditional rule is based on this recognition of diverse in-
terests. As a result, the modem approach to choice of law is more than
a search for a better reasoned rule. It is a change in basic theory, since
courts applying the modem approach no longer recognize the validity
of the vested rights theory.
In Ingersoll, the Illinois Supreme Court concurred with this analysis.
It stated that there are many choice influencing considerations, only one
29. Cuba v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 478-79 (1912), Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d
473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1962). Beale, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 51.
See, Chicago & E.I.R. Co. v. Ririse, 178 111. 132, 52 N.E. 951 (1899).
30. 29 A.L.R.3d 603, 623.
31. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1962).
32. Id. at p. 481.
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of which is the place of the tort."3 Consequently, following Ingersoll,
the choice of applicable law will include consideration of the contacts
of all states having a relationship with the occurrence. 4
The court dismissed the traditional rule by summarily referring to the
standard justifications for the place of the tort rule (predictability of
outcome, ease of applicability, symmetry, and discouragement of forum
shopping)3" as benefits a court could derive from applying the law of
Alaska, as the law of our coldest state.36 In addition to being super-
ficial, the justifications often turned out to be pure fiction. Many courts
were often very liberal in using one of the several exceptions that be-
came part of the traditional rule.3" The result was that lex loci delicti
was neither easy to apply nor predictable in outcome. The reaction of
the court was to state "[A] most significant contracts rule best serves
the interests of the State and the parties involved in a multi-state tort ac-
tion."3  The nucleus of this idea, was adopted by the court from Sec-
tion 379, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1969), which considers the interests of all states having a relationship
with the tort. This section states:
(1) The local law which has the most significant relationship with
the occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and
liabilities in tort.
(2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in determining
the state of the most significant relationship include: (a) the
place were the injury occurred. (b) the place where the con-
duct occurred. (c) the domicile, nationality, place of incorpora-
tion and place of business of the parties (d) the place where the
relationship of the parties is centered.
(3) In determining the relative importance of the contacts, the
forum will consider the issues, the character of the tort, and the
relevant purposes of the tort rules of the interested States.3 9
The Illinois Supreme Court has attempted to substitute a "signifi-
cant contacts" rule contoured along the methodology suggested by the
RESTATEMENT 2D, for the rule of lex loci delicti. Unfortunately, the
court neglected explicit reference to section 379(3) which calls for
consideration of "the issues, the character of the tort and the relevant
purposes of the tort rules of the interested states." The result was that
33. 262 N.E.2d at 596.
34. Id. at p. 596.
35. 31 J.A.T.L.A. 534 (1965).
36. Id.
37. University of Chicago v. Dater, 227 Mich. 658, 220 N.W. 175 (1936), Levy v.
Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163 (1928).
38. 262 N.E.2d at 596.
39. Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 379 (1969).
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the court's approach apparently added together all the contacts re-
lated to the incident and determined which state had the most signifi-
cant relationship. The court neither considered the disadvantages of
allowing a guest to sue his host, nor analyzed the reasons for the exist-
ing guest-host statutes in Illinois and Iowa.
In order to be consistent with the modem approach and the RE-
STATEMENT 2D, it is necessary to consider each contact in light of an
analysis of the relevant purposes of the tort rules of the interested states.
When the court failed to apply this criterion to determine the relative
importance of the various contacts, it merely substituted a contact
counting test for the old place of the tort test and omitted the factor
which saves the RESTATEMENT 2D and other modem approaches
from being arbitrary.4 ° Of course, on the facts of this case, such an
analysis would have led to the same result which the court reached.
Therefore, the court may merely have deemed this type of analysis un-
necessary. Nevertheless, since the court was adopting an entirely new
approach to conflict of laws problems in the tort area, it would have
been desirable to indicate whether these factors are or are not to be rele-
vant in future cases. Regardless of whether the court intended to fol-
low the approach of the RESTATEMENT 2D, or intended to establish
a new approach, it has, as previously indicated, in fact applied the law
of the state with the 'most significant relationship' according to the
terms of the RESTATEMENT 2D.
Had the Illinois Supreme Court used the section 379(3) analysis,
it would have conducted an examination of the relevant purposes of
the tort rules of the interested states. It could have considered that
Illinois law:
[E]vidences a desire to (a) prevent collusive suits between hosts
and guests; (b) prevent the ingratitude of the guest who sues his
kindly host (bites the hand that feeds him); (c) protect the host
from being obligated for more than he bargained for (a judgment
when only offered a ride); and (d) keep intact a fund (the host's
assets) so it can be reached by other parties to the accident whose
claims are assumed to have some vague moral priority over the
claims of the gratuitous guest. 4 1
Iowa law, on the other hand, would have imposed liability in the
guest-host situation when intoxication is proven against the host. 42
40. This statement presupposes that lex loci delicti was determined by one con-
tact; namely, the state where the tort occurred.
41. Heath v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 590, 591, 151 N.W.2d 664, 669 (1967).
42. IOWA CODE, Ch. 321, 494.
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Imposing liability on the host when intoxicated evidences a policy
aimed at punishing the host to the extent that damages in a negligence
action are punitive; at deterring further negligence by intoxicated per-
sons on Iowa roads; and at providing funds to the injured guest so that
state authorities, who have furnished medical services, will be compen-
sated.43
Considering the Ingersoll factual situation in light of these relevant
policies, the court would have determined which state had the more sig-
nificant relationship. This analysis is the key to erasing fortuity in the
adjudication of a multi-state tort action.
An application of the aforementioned analysis of policies shows that
Illinois interests are more directly concerned since any collusive suit
would be between its residents, and would include the determination of
the liabilities of an Illinois based insurance company.44 Iowa interests,
however, are not significantly concerned since: (1) no state authori-
ties furnished medical services, and (2) safety on Iowa roads was not
threatened. Consequently, the court would have found that the in-
terests of Illinois were more directly involved.
In recent decisions, the most important consideration for many courts
has been to view accidents in light of the terms and purposes of the
competing laws of the interested states.45 Professor Ehrenzweig dis-
agrees with this trend.46 He submits that conflict of laws cases are
usually concerned with private, not governmental or state interests.47
He looks to the law of the forum for direction. From this starting
point, he then examines the development of a common law of con-
flicts based on "consistent judicial practice"4 which will provide excep-
tions to the basic rule. He expects this judicial practice to implement
the consideration of private interests.
Most courts have implicitly adopted the view which states:
Even within the sphere of private law, [the rules] generally rep-
resent norms for the ordering of behavior, not merely for dispute
settlement, and today public law objectives are coming increasingly
to infiltrate private law.49
Some courts have used the RESTATEMENT 2D approach in order to
adopt the theory that several states might have competing interests in
43. Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579, 582 (1968).
44. Id. at p. 582.
45. Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 603, 623.
46. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws, § 122 (1962).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Cavers, The Choice of Law Process (1965).
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one accident. 0 Other courts have used a governmental interest analysis
approach.5' The governmental interest theory, initially advanced by
the late Brainard Currie, involves admittance "of the teachings of so-
ciological jurisprudence into the conceptualistic precincts of conflict of
laws." 2  Currie's theory proceeds on the basis that courts will as a mat-
ter of course apply the law of the forum. He then adds:
When it is suggested that the law of a foreign state should furnish
the rule of decision, the Court should, first of all, determine the
governmental policy expressed in the law of the forum. It should
then inquire whether the relation of the forum to the case is such
as to provide a legitimate basis for the assertion of an interest in
the application of that policy.
If necessary, the court should similarly determine the policy ex-
pressed by the foreign law, and whether the foreign state has an
interest in the application of its policy.
If the court finds that the forum state has an interest in the applica-
tion of its policy, it should apply the law of the forum, even
though the foreign state also has an interest in the application of its
contrary policy, and, a fortiori, it should apply the law of the
forum if the foreign state has no such interest.53
One authority has noted that "[T]he contacts test [of the RE-
STATEMENT 2D] tends to become an [governmental] interest analysis
when the significance of a contact is assessed in terms of the policies
underlying such state's law." 54 Upon adopting the proposition that sev-
eral states can have legitimate interests in the outcome of the accident,
this similarity is inherent.
The governmental interest analysis approach was adopted in Wilcox
v. Wilcox,55 a case cited by the court in Ingersoll as authority for reject-
ing the place of the injury rule, but not used as a vehicle for suggesting
a new approach to solving conflicts problems. The court in Wilcox
stated that:
[W]e believe that in order to determine the most significant rela-
tionship consideration should be given to the policies and inter-
ests of the forum state, the tort state, and of other states that may
have an interest by virtue of the domicile of the parties or other
relevant factors. 56
50. Annot., 29 ALR 3d 603, 625-629.
51. Id. at pp. 629-63 1.
52. Brainard Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws, p. 188 (1963).
53. Id. at pp. 188-189.
54. Cramton & Currie, Conflict of Laws p. 253.
55. 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
56. Id. at p. 415.
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court later adopted the approach proposed
by Robert Leflar.57 This method consists of using five major choice-
influencing considerations: (1) predictability of results, (2) mainte-
nance of interstate and international order, (3) simplification of the
judicial task, (4) advancement of the forum's governmental interests
and (5) application of the "Better Rule of Law"; which incorporates
all or most of the factors which ordinarily influence choice-of-law deci-
sions. 58
This theory is not a rule, but rather a system of analyzing relevant
considerations for making a choice of law. The advantage this method
has over Currie's governmental interest analysis is that it offers a ra-
tional solution to a conflicts situation in which more than one state has
a valid interest. Currie opts for application of the forum's law when
there are true conflicting interests because he denies that one state may
have a more valid, real interest than another.59 Leflar offers the solu-
tion of chooosing the "Better Rule of Law" when two state's laws are
in conflict; he states:
[C]ourts have always taken the content of competing rules into
account, but they have too often used characterization, renvoi,
multiple-choice rules, or the like as manipulative devices to cover
up what they were really doing, when there was no need at all
for any cover up.60
Leflar's five major choice-influencing considerations encompass the
governmental interest analysis of Currie, the "most significant rela-
tionship" of the RESTATEMENT 2D, and they add the final consid-
eration of choosing the better law.
It would seem that Leflar's Choice-Influencing Considerations is the
most realistic and rational method for making a choice of law. It may
possibly be the theory that the Illinois court finally chooses when it
completes its transition from the rule of lex loci delicti to a more modern
approach. However, the next step will probably be a more thorough
explication of the doctrine adopted in principle in Ingersoll and this, it
seems, will tend toward the view of the RESTATEMENT 2D.
JAMES RuBIN
57. Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
58. 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584, 1585-88 (1966).
59. B. Currie, Selected Essays, p. 190.
60. 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1588 (1966).
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